Since the promulgation of the Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations (UN) has become a battleground for the ongoing struggle over the scope and content of an adequately inclusive human rights regime. The fight for recognition of indigenous peoples in international law, on which this research focuses, presents a formidable challenge to the universalizing mission of the UN. This is due to a continuing contestation between indigenous peoples and some states over the affirmation of indigenous peoples' legal status as "peoples", with a corresponding right to self-determination under international law, and the recognition of their collective rights as human rights. However, while international law appears to be providing some spaces for the dispossessed on the one hand, it continues on the other, albeit subconsciously, to bow its head to its very roots, which, as this paper will attempt to show, is inextricably, connected to the colonial encounter. This paper questions whether the established human rights discourse can serve as a strategic tool for indigenous peoples, or if it is in fact working to delegitimize indigenous discourses and worldviews.
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Ibid. international law's claims to universality, because such universality would demand the inclusion of indigenous peoples as equal actors. In search of International Law's memory of its violent origins, this paper shall look to the existing, yet fragmented and often rejected narratives and memories of those that found themselves excluded in the creation of international law. This constitutes an act of decentring mainstream discourses and reviving indigenous memory of exclusion and oppression, which will contribute to a better understanding of international law's repressed memory of its own colonialist heritage. The objective is not to provide proposals for a reform of international law, but to outline conditions, which indigenous peoples encounter in the sphere of international law as they attempt to advance their claims.
I. Introduction: Que dirian, cuando vuelva nuestro Inka?
Inkarri's brother Espanarri cut off Inkarri's head…The highest mountains know. Inkarri's head is trying to grow towards his feet. The pieces of him will surely come together one day. On that day he will walk the earth followed by the birds.
Eduardo Galeano, Memory of Fire, I. Genesis, 1982 2 Since the first moment of the encounter with the Spaniards, a choice between two alternatives became apparent to the diverse indigenous nations of the Americas: to accept or reject the conquest. The result of the second alternative is evident in the orally transmitted Andean narrative of the Inkarri. The title, 3 Inkarri, comes from the Quechua pronunciation of Spanish words Inca Rey, or the Inka King. It tells the tale of the last Inka nobleman and rebel leader in Peru, Jose Gabriel Condorcanqui Tupac Amaru II (the 'Great Snake' in Quechua) and his followers who were taken to Cuzco, the capital of the Inka Empire, and summarily tried and executed for treason. On 18 May 1791, before a large gathering in the central square, Tupac Amaru II watched the hanging of his family members and execution of his wife Micaela Bastidias by garroting. After being tortured and then unsuccessfully drawn and quartered (his limbs could not be separated from his body by the horses employed), the rebel leader was beheaded. In the aftermath, the Spaniards unleashed a reign of terror against the Quechua people. The conquest had severed the head of the Inca, which ever since remained separated from the body; according to the story, when both come
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Indigenous identity becomes that of a victim or subversive, obscuring the multifaceted dimensions of indigenous 4 mobilization. Current attempts at a universal definition of 'Indigenous' also impose limits on indigenous peoples' political, cultural, or economic aspirations. It emphasizes the status of being colonized and dominated, obscuring indigenous individual nationalities. It is important to note that the Spanish defeat of Tupac Amaru II, for instance, was assisted by other indigenous groups, who were subjugated by the Incas prior to the Spanish arrival. The association of indigenous peoples with a status of mere victims is easily complicated by these situations and alliances.
Youngblood Henderson, James (Sakej), "The Context of the State of Nature," in Marie Battiste (ed.), Reclaiming
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Indigenous Voice and Vision. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000, p. 11.
Ibid. 6 Derrida, Jacques, "Canons and Metonomies: An interview with Jacques Derrida," in Richard Rand (ed.). 7 Logomachia, The Conflict of the Faculties. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992. together again, the period of disorder, confusion, and darkness initiated by the Europeans will end and the Andean people will recuperate their memory. 4 Inkarri is a memory of a failed indigenous rebellion against the Spaniards and the centuries of darkness that ensued. The story recollects an instance of violence committed against a people. It also recollects the period in which the notion or a colonial narrative of 'indigenous' emerges, as the vanquished other, the subjugated, and the victim. The relationship between the colonizer and the colonized became a source of many debates in the sixteenth century among Spanish theologians and jurists, over the legitimacy of the Spanish invasion, as well as the legitimacy of indigenous rebellion against it. The hierarchical and discriminatory nature of colonial societies has been legitimized through philosophical understanding of the ontological asymmetry of human species. This was the moral, but also rational legitimization of the relation of domination within colonial societies and the colonial ethnocide.
The announcement of a possible revolution and reversal of the colonial order in narratives such as the Inkarri remained in the minds of the European colonizers as a potential violent disturbance to the newly established hierarchies, allowing them to resort to terror as a legitimate source of sovereign power and law. The terrible injustice of colonialism could be compensated only at the cost of transferring the 5 fear of Indians to the whites. The modern jurisprudence, however, concealed the effects of colonial violence on those who suffer under the rule of law in the colonies. This history became a suppressed 6 memory within the institutions and values of the international law; what remained was only its universal moralism. And in time, as far as the indigenous peoples could not escape this hegemonic political culture, they manipulated and appropriated it within the context of the emerging colonial system. The memory of violence, however, never disappeared; it remained guarded within the subconscious of a culture whose memory never forgot the details.
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This paper is divided into four sections. Section I discusses the colonial origins of international law, focusing on its structural grounding and the need to legitimate the violent invasion of the Americas.
It looks at the sixteenth century debate among Spanish theologians and jurists, evaluating the legitimacy , 1999, pp. 3-4. 9 Ibid.
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of Spanish conquest of the Americas and the extremity of violence waged against indigenous populations. Discourses that took place in the sixteenth century, concerned directly indigenous people's lives, but excluded them as equal interlocutors and questioned their place in the emerging international order. Section II observes briefly the evolution of international law through the nineteenth century positivism, culminating in the contemporary discourses of human rights. It examines how international law developed a contradictory notion that in order for order, progress and enlightenment to spread, violence, however extreme, would be needed to modernize the local peoples who did not want to be modernized. Section III observes the extent to which the contemporary international law has the capacity to recognize this contradiction and its colonial past through human rights discourse. It examines this question by focusing on the principle of self-determination. Section IV contains brief final conclusions. Arguedas, 1984 8 Conquest of new lands was a primary concern of Europeans who arrived to South America in the sixteenth century, and few had sufficient preparation or interest to comprehend the challenges represented by the world they encountered. They did not recognize or understand the societies with 9 organizational and recording traditions radically different from their own. Thus, for Spaniards who came from overseas "preoccupied with enriching themselves, securing honours, and evangelizing natives by force," the primary intellectual concern was finding new justifications for the invasion. An abyss then 10 formed between the local peoples and the Spaniards, which to the present day continues to mark the most profound structural fission in the identities of postcolonial societies.
II. Indigenous Peoples and Development of International Law: Early Experiences
In his account of Latin American history, Vitoria, 1951, pp. 38-43. divine law, his own precepts are deeply rooted in Christian thought. As Vitoria mentions, natural law encompassed all rational humanity, and included rights such as the right to travel, sojourn, trade, and proselytize in foreign lands. Indigenous peoples had to respond positively to Spanish arrival, because this was a part of some preceding consensus of among sovereign peoples. But in order to constitute a sovereign people they had to resemble the Europeans; otherwise they were non-sovereign. The indigenous peoples, not resembling the Spaniards, consequently entered a permanent situation of inclusion and exclusion in international law.
The discussion on legitimacy of colonialism continued to oscillate further between criticism and apology for colonial invasion in the debate between Bartolome De Las Casas and Juan Gines de sovereign, while the pagan Indios were not, and could be legitimately subjected to Spanish domination.
Brief episodes of troubling conscience, which Las Casas exposed in his dramatic testimonies of brutalities in the colonies, became a blind spot in the emerging doctrines of natural law among sovereign nations.
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Hanke, Lewis Supra note 24 at p. 4. The Spanish debate had established themes and concepts, which reinvented themselves at different stages in history of international law. The colonial encounter produced a new mental category to codify the relations between conquering and conquered populations: the idea of race as biologically structured, explaining not just physiognomic differences, but also the mental and cultural differences.
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Those relations of domination came to be considered as natural and legitimized through international law, which was formulated as a universal law based on natural law principles and found through human reason. With the colonization of the Americas, new material, subjective, and intersubjective relations were created alongside the emergence of the new Euro-centred, capitalist, colonial world power structure. Indigenous peoples occupied a lower status in this new universe as objects of study or domination, exploitation, and discrimination. All non-Europeans could be placed in relation to the Europeans in a linear revolutionary process from primitive to civilized, irrational to rational; in other words, from non-civilized to Europeanized or modernized. The new dilemma of international law was the oscillation between the priority of sovereignty and normative law; particularity and universality. The position of indigenous peoples, remained the same.
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The lack of civilization denied them the recognition of their right to self-governance. The discourse of rights referred to the rights of civilized nations to govern the non-European savage communities. If the notion of human rights occurred in a non-Western society, it was said to be entirely due to the diffusion of the Enlightenment ideas among them. As Martti Koskenniemi explains, the credo of the universal 35 applicability of this discourse could be described as follows:
I will accept you, but only on the condition that I may think of you as I think of myself. However, recognition of particularity may be an act of condescension, and at worst a The effort of international legal discourse was to uphold colonial and imperial forces denying the indigenous peoples the right and capacity to influence their own destinies as equal members of the international community. International lawyers of European empires viewed colonization as "a perfectly natural drive; just as ownership was a projection of the owner's person in the material world, colonial possession was an aspect of the healthy state's identity and self-respect." century, an imaginary society of supposedly sovereign and independent nation states, became the fundamental notion that marked contained independence of the nation state. In the same way, international law became exclusively an issue of relations between sovereigns, which were intrinsically contrasted to certain uncivilized others excluded from participation in international law.
Still, as in the times of Vitoria, humanitarian problems that accompanied colonialism remained.
The humanitarian crises, however, could be solved "through the export of rational, public, law based hand is the assumption that all humanity was once savage, but while the Occidental civilization was able to supersede this pre-civil state other still non-civilized societies could not. The West ceased to have savagery in common with the other peoples, but at the same time it continued to seek universal norms through which to include the savage peoples into the world community.
In the twentieth century it finally transformed into the era of pragmatism and institutions.
Relationships created with colonialism translated into the language of law, while the actual histories became sanitized or retold as events of a far away past, which international law was apparently capable of overcoming with the advent of twentieth century human rights discourse.
IV. The Age of Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples
We are the victims of genocide in the most terrible and explicit meaning of that idea. which not only claimed universality, but also seemed to give agency to previously marginalized populations.
However, the universalization of a juridical order based on precept which affirmed basic and inviolable dignity of human life, owed its existence to the enormous impact of a universal cultural event: 
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The content of this meaning is taken from Article 1.1 of ICCPR, "All peoples have the right of self-determination. 45 By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
In Charter of the United Nations, 1 United Nations Treaty Series xv1; (1946).
48

Question of Indigenous Self-Determination
Beneath all the talk of human rights and their universal applicability, the ambiguousness of the principle of self-determination illuminates the fundamental contradictions of international law -its legitimation of colonial violence, contrasted with normative pretences and ambitions. Self-determination, if it were to take on its proper meaning, would undermine the essential principle on which international law was 45 founded, the existence of sovereign nation states. Here, however, re-emerges the question of who creates and defines norms and principles of international law, and in whose language. If indigenous peoples are peoples, their right to self-determination would be undeniable in accordance with international law and as such, could potentially endanger the unity of existing sovereign states. If, however, they are not peoples, as some states claim, they have no such right, and remain non-sovereign, just as Vitoria explained over 400 years ago.
Because of the domination of settler states in the international system, the legal principle of selfdetermination and the process of decolonization became applied only in the context of state-to-state relations in the post war period. As Antonio Casesse argues, one of the legal modes of acquisition of territory under the classical international law included colonial conquest. The observance of indigenous self-determination as a threat to national or international security by some states unravels the problem in international law of the need for order, as well as the need for change. However the need for change is evident even in more mainstream theory on contemporary international law. Thomas Franck's emphasis on fair processes as means to just outcomes, results in his emphasis of the importance of a right to democratic government, which, "
while not yet fully encapsulated by law, is now rapidly becoming a normative rule of the international system." In a sense, self-56 determination then becomes a source of democratic government "self-determination is the historic root from which the democratic government grew." He, however, does not endorse a more permissible 57 external right to self-determination than is already permitted by the colonial model. Franck argues for national systems of government which prove their validity with established rules and processes which legitimize their governance. In discussing the possibility of extending the application of the law of selfdetermination he gives the example of minorities who have been denied political and social equality and the opportunity to retain its cultural identity. Here, a tension begins to emerge in his argument for, on 58 the one hand, Franck disapproves of the separatist agenda, which he associates with 'post-modern tribalism' but on the other, his broader moral framework leads to the conclusion that international lawyers should find more appropriate responses to these nationalist claims by way of fairness discourse which in turn may lead to a deconstruction of the colonial model and to the possibility of a right of secession for groups denied the opportunity to retain their cultural identity.
The assertions to the right of self-determination are diverse and vary from nation to nation.
Indigenous movements for restoration of their autonomous power and cultural integrity are in some cases nationhood, or community as a whole and asserting control over indigenous land and life. As Taiaike argues "Part of the problem now is that our space hasn't been respected, that we've had structures and ideas imposed on us. We need to reclaim our intellectual, political, and geographic space." At present, 60 indigenous peoples practice politics in the context of state law, or at best, international human rights law.
Even if they succeed in achieving some of their goals, such as self-government, the basic power structures remain intact.
Cirkovic g Colonial Foundations in International Law and Indigenous Struggles / 17
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 A (iii), Adopted 10 December 1948. 
Self-Determination as a Human Right
The current impasse reached at the United Nations regarding the indigenous peoples' right to selfdetermination and its inclusion in the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, is a result of the apparent failure to reconcile the discord between indigenous demands and human rights institutions, which were not created with indigenous peoples in mind as equal actors. The human rights covenants and other international instruments declare that 'peoples' have the right to self-determination. The preamble of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights asserts that "Whereas it is essential, if a man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort to a rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law" and "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." This ambiguity of terminology has been the source of endless debates in the international human rights system, trying to determine what constitutes a 'people' and who has the right to self-determination.
General practice in traditional international law since 1945 affirms those entities that qualify as peoples with a corresponding right to self-determination are either tied to some objective criteria linked to ethnicity or historical sovereignty, or an aggregate population of a state or "one that is entitled to become a state." People are an entity that a priori has attributes of sovereignty or statehood. In order to 66 accommodate indigenous claims to self-determination, the existing international law system would have to re-define and expand this practice.
By virtue of its inclusion in important international treaties, self-determination is a human rights norm that already exists in international law as a part of general or customary law. It also exists in relevant practices, which include discourses and action by which claims are presented in the name of self-determination, and by which authoritative responses to those claims are made. Indigenous peoples 67 are thus appealing to a certain set of values of perceived universal applicability and norms that denote the way things should be for all humanity.
While the human rights regime reflects the 'normativity' of law, the development of rights implies that something is to be protected by some authority, and a violation of that right remedied accordingly. It then becomes defined and delimited by authoritative definition of that right, which is inevitably hierarchical and political. Indigenous peoples gain legitimacy through their activism use of human rights principles, and proper channels of existing national and international legal institutions.
Rights discourses presuppose an existence of democratic institutions as well as their accessibility to potential claimants. Legitimacy of a particular struggle is evaluated through the lens of accepted institutional language. Right to self-determination becomes delimited by the existing authority of international legal institutions, which define, narrow, or broaden its scope. Undoubtedly there are 'pressures from below,' violent or peaceful secessionist movements, lobbying of non-governmental organizations and such, but how decisions are made within international institutions is limited by their ultimate goal and purpose. And what is the ultimate goal and purpose of the UN? The UN Charter, does not only concern itself with protection of human rights, but also with humanitarian intervention and territorial administration. The United Nations might offer space for resistance against imperialism, but at the same time it remains a tool for imperialism as a "manager of problems in the developing world."
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The colonial relationships between international law and the 'developing' world remain present not just
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This topic has been the subject of recent critical scholarship on international law. See, Anghie, Supra note 32.
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In the Inter-American System, the most successful case has been the Awas Tigni v. Nicaragua case, where the as a matter of history, but as a current reality. Marginalized groups thus remain in a position where they 69 hope to ameliorate their situations through an instrument that does not recognize them as equal actors.
Declaring Indigenous Rights in International Law
While some countries were celebrating five hundred-year anniversary of the colonial discovery in1992, Brothers and sisters, we are in this great house but it is not our house. We are in a palace where documents are written for Peoples but not for our Indigenous Peoples. They open doors for us to enter but they close their ears and hearts. What can we do? We can do many things, even a hunger strike.
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The Decade ended with the failure of efforts to see the Draft Declaration adopted by the Human Rights Commission, questioning whether any gains have been made in pursuit of Indigenous selfdetermination at an international forum. In response, indigenous people's representatives at the UN initiated a hunger strike, which ended after a negotiation with representatives from the UN Commission for Human Rights, and a promise for future developments regarding the Draft Declaration.
In past three decades, representatives of indigenous peoples increasingly sought to engage with international law and institutions. Still, long before UN designated the Indigenous Decade, indigenous convince the members of the sub-commission that indigenous peoples did not belong to same category as minorities, and that in some countries they still constitute the majority of the population. those servants of the gods -the gloomy darkness, threats, and terror that were raised up and heightened -are being weakened and worn away, so are these borders, I believe." The open question is whether 82 the colonial borders of international law are being weakened; whether other speeches can gain presence;
for in its original mandate, human rights discourse belongs to the very Leviathan indigenous peoples are trying to oppose.
V. Conclusion
The review of human rights discourse in international law and its capacity to empower or subvert indigenous struggles requires a recollection of its colonial past. The purpose of this essay has not been to With the emergence of human rights discourse, indigenous peoples become nominally included as participants, but within limits of established discourses and norms. Indigenous peoples continue to struggle for a reform of Eurocentric legal texts, which deny their heritage and knowledge. The international indigenous movement is attempting to provide an alternative view of existing principles and broaden the definitions and cultural reach of human rights. These attempts to 'indigenization' of international law represent for the existing states a new current, which threatens just as the Inkarri myth, to reverse the centuries long period of disorder and confusion initiated by the Europeans.
